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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOIS H. WHITE, Widow of PAUL 
WHITE, deceased, 
Applicant and Appellant, 
-vs.-
N. P. METTOME C 0 M PAN Y, 
STATE INSUR.ANCE FUND and 
INDUSTRIAL C·0~1:MISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 8193 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action against the State Insurance Fund 
before the Industrial Commission of Utah by the Appel-
lant, Lois H. White, widow of Paul White, deceased, 
to recover compensation as a result of the death of Paul 
White in the course of his employment. 
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T'he Industrial Con1mission heard the evidence on the 
4th day of February, 1954, beginning at 10:00 A.M. The 
hearing was held before Robert J. Shaughnessy, Referee. 
The Con1mission entered its order on the 4th day of 
l\farch, 1954, denying the clai1n of the Appellant. The 
Appellant thereafter on the 13th day of March, 1954, filed 
an application ·before the Industrial Con1n1ission for a 
re-hearing, which ap'Plication for re-hearing \vas denied 
on April 8th, 1954. 
The Ap·pellant filed her Petition for 'Vrit of Certi-
orari on the 1st day of l\{ay, 1954, and the In'dustrial Con1-
mission of Utah filed w:bth this Court the record of this 
ca:se on the 17th day of May, 1954. 
STATEMENT OF· F:ACTS 
The facts of this case are very sin1ple. Lois H. 
White, the Ap·pellant, and Paul White, the deceased, 
were married on the 21st day of Nove1nber, 1941, and 
a Decree of Divorce \Vas awarded to Lois I-I. vVhite fron1 
Paul White, Case No. 99089, in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County, ·State of Utah, on the lOth day of July, 
1953. 
On the 6th day of October, 1953, while Paul vVhite 
"\vas employed as an iron\vorker by the N. P. :Niettome 
Company, he sustained an injury arising out of, or in the 
course of, his employment and died as a result of said in-
jury two days later on October 8th, 1953. He \Vas earning 
$2.67 per hour on a 40 hour p·er week basis. 
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During the period of tiine between the date of the 
divorce and the date of the death, Mr. and Mrs. White 
had seen each other on a number of occasions and had 
con1municated by telephone on numerous other occasions. 
At the tune of and prior to the divorce Mr. White had 
been addicted to the excessive use of alcoholic beverages, 
and ~1rs. "\Vhite had insisted on a divorce with the hope 
that he \vould straighten up and terminate his excessive 
drinking; in \Vhich event, the parties had agreed that 
they \vould resu1ne their marital relationship and have 
the decree set aside during that period of time. 
Between the date of the divorce and the date of the 
death of 1\Ir. \Vhite, l\Ir. White had ceased his excessive 
drinking and had been employed steadily, and Mr. and 
l\1rs. White had discussed on several occasions the setting 
aside of the divorce and the resumption of the marriage. 
Just a day or t''ro before the death of ~1r. \Vhite he had 
talked \vith jlr~. \\l1ite and had 1nade a specific appoint-
Inent \\~ith her for the following Sunday, at \vhich time 
they planned to complete their arrange1nents to set aside 
the divoree and to go back and live together as 1nan and 
\vife, and she agreed with hirn that she would quit work 
and go back and take care of the house, and that he -vvould 
continue \\'orking and n1aintain and support then1 after 
resu1nption of their Inarital status. Before this eventful 
Sunday arrived of course l\Ir. White was killed and the 
resu1nption of the marriage, of course, never took place 
as they had planned. 
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
POINT I 
T·HE COMMISSION ERRED IN FINDING THAT LOIS 
H. WHITE AND PAUL WHITE WERE NOT HUSBAND AND 
WIFE. 
P·OINT II 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE 
WAS NO DEPENDENCY NOR PRESUMPTION OF DEPEND-
ENCY BY MRS. WHITE ON HER HUSBAND, PAUL WHITE. 
POINT III 
THE CO:MMISSION 'ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE 
·wAS NO AGR.EED DEPENDENCY OF MRS. WHITE ON 
HER HUSBAND, MR. WHITE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION ER.RED IN FINDING THAT LOIS 
H. WHITE AND PAUL WHITE WERE NOT HUSBAND AND 
WIFE. 
The cases seem to hold almost unani1nously that the 
death of a spouse during the interlocutory period of di-
vorce tern1inates the marriage rather than the running 
of the interlocutory period as the following cases unequi-
vocably intlicated : 
Remley v. Remley, 193 P. 604 
This was an action for divorce "~herein the 
court ordered th·e payment of a monthly allowance 
for the support of minor children, and gave a lien 
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5 
to the plaintiff to secure the payment of the allo\v-
a.nce against defendant's interest in homestead 
property: 
(2) 'l'he interlocutory judgment in a divorce 
aetion is not a decree of divorce nor does it dis-
solve the 1narriage. It j s rnerely a declaration that 
one of the spouse~ is entitled to a divorce (section 
131, CiY. Code), and ,, .. hen one year has expired 
after the en tr~· of such in terloeutory judgrnent the 
court n1ay enter the final judgrnent, granting the 
divorce, and such other relief as 1nay be necessary 
to co1nplete disposition of the action. 
( 3) In its decision the court should deter-
Inine \\·hether a divorce ought to he granted; it 
should designate the party entitled thereto, and 
if propert~r rights are involved it should deter-
llline ho'v the property shoulid be disposed of or 
a~signed 'vhen such divorce is granted. 
Goulcl v. Superior Court, 191 P. 56. 
This action \\·a::; originally a divorce action 
brought hy Frank H. Gould against his \Vife, 
Nettie Gould, and on her cross-con1plaint she was 
granted a decree and eertain properties and 
rnonthly payn1ents as per1nanent ali1nony. Frank 
H. Goultcl died one 1nonth after the interlocutory 
decree was entered: 
( 1) Under the provisions of section 132 of 
the Civil Code, the 1narital status of the parties 
\Yas not affected by the interlocutory decree, fur-
ther than that it established conclusively, unless 
~et aside on appeal or in ~orne other Inanner ex-
pressly provided by statute, the defendant's right 
to divorce upon the expiration of the statutory 
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period of one year, which 1nust elapse between 
the entry of the interlocutory decree and the final 
judgn1ent disssolving tl1e rnarriage. 
(6 ['\J 7) The death of the husband ter1ninated 
the n1arital relationship. - - -· Upon the death 
of the husband, the rights of the wife under the 
laws of succession, if he died intestate, were fixed, 
unless those rights had theretofore been changed 
by contract vtith the husband. 
(8 & 9) Since the marriage was not dis-
solved by the entry of the final decree, but hy the 
death of tl1e husband -- - it would appear-
- - that the entry of the final decree accom-
plished nothing. 
,Gloyd v. S1tperior Court, 185 P. 995. 
This '\Vas a ease where Albert M. Gloyd was 
granted an interlocutory decree against his wife. 
Shortly thereafter and during the interlocutory 
period he 'died and she clain1s his estate as his 
vvido,v. The court held that the death terminated 
the n1arriage and not the divorce, and stated as 
follO'\VS: 
(3) That relation and status having been dis-
solved by death, the petitioner, ~faiette S. Gloyd, 
forthvvith became the surviving wife of Albert M. 
Gloyd, vvith the vested right to be recognized as 
his '\Vi1dovv and '\vith such furth.er vested rights of 
property as n1ay result from the fact that she '\vas 
his .,vife at the tirne of his death. 
The Court in this ·same ca:se quoted from the 
estate of 'Valker, 168 P. 689, in which case the 
court stated: 
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HThe 1narriage relation existing betw"een the . 
husband and wife was not dissolved by the inter-
locutor~v decree of divorce, but by the death of 
the husband on N ove1nber 20, 1913." 
The following cases all hold specifically that 
an interlocutory decree of divorce does not ternli-
nate the rnarriage and that the ruarriage is not 
terininated until the expiration of the interlocu-
tory period, and that a 111arriage contracted dur-
ing the interlocutory period is void ah initio be-
cause of the prior exi~ting rnarriage and that a 
death \vhich occurs during the interlocutory peri-
od ter1ninates the 1narriage and not the death.: 
Sanders v. Industrial Connnission (230 P. 
1026) ~ Salt Lake City v. Industrial Co1nmission 
(:2:2 I). 2d 1046) ~ l{Jebora v. l{Jebora (5 P 2d 965) 
Re: Johnson's Estate-Johnson v. Johnson (35 
P. 2d 305). 
POINT II 
TI-IE CO?dl\fiSSION ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE 
WAS NO DEPENDENCY NOR PRESUTv1PTION OF DEPEND-
ENCY BY l\1RS. WHITE ON HER HUSBAND, PAUL WHITE. 
~Phe courts hold \vith reference to Point II that the 
lack of actual support by the husband does not of itself 
negatiYe dependency, whieh theor~T is borne out in the 
follo"\ving as "\vell as in 1nany other ca~cs : 
Diaz vs. Industrial Conunission of Utah) 13 P. 2d :307. 
In this ca:se the \vife and children had heen 
separated fro1n the husband for approximately 
tv~.,.o years, hut the separation di\d not elin1inate the 
hushnnd's ohligation to support, nor did it termi-
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nate the dependency of the "rife on the husband. 
There are numerous cases cited in this case up-
holding the same ·doctrine. 
lJfcGarry vs. Iruiust1*ial Corn1nissi-on., 222 I>. 592. 
Thi's court stated that ~·,ve kno\v of no 
authority which holds that the furnishing of sup-
port during the life of the deceased is absolutely 
essential to the establishment of actual depend-
ency", 
Merrill vs. Penasco L1onber Con~pany, 204 P. 72. 
The court sai'd "That just as the existance of 
the marital status does not of itself proYe de-
pendency, so the lack of actual support by the 
husband does not of itself negative dependency". 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE 
WAS NO AGREED DEPENDENCY O·F MRS. WHITE ON 
HER HUSBAND, MR. WHITE. 
With reference to Point III, this court has laid do,vn 
.the law on this point very clearly as set forth in the case 
of, Utah Galena Corporation et al vs. Industrial Connnis-
sion et al, 5P. 2·d 242 : 
This is a case involving the question of dependency. 
Judge Folland in his opinion in this case 
quotes as follows from 28 R.C.L. pages 770 and 
771, as being the la\v in the State of l!tah: 
(a) "As a very general proposition it n1ay 
be said that a dependent is one 'vho looked to or 
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relied on the decendent for support and main-
tenance. Reliance n1ust have been placed upon 
the deceased employee to provide the applicant 
for con1pensation, in so1ne Ineasure or to so1ne 
extent, \Yith his or her ft~:turc living expenses. 
o;;< '~ * rrhe purpose of the statute is to provide the 
\Vorlnnan's dependent in fnt u re \Vi th something in 
substitution for \vhat has been lost by the work-
Ulan's death, and consequently, to establish de-
pendene:- the applicant for cou1pensation Inust 
sho\v that he or she had reasonable grou(n:ds to 
an.ficipatc future support froin the decedent. This 
reasonable (\Tpectation of continning or fu.tnre 
support and nza.intcnauce seen1s to be the true 
criterion as to zcho are dependents." 
Judge Folland in the san1e opinion quotes 
fron1 :!S R. C.L. at page 771, the follo\ving as being 
the la,,- of the State of l:tah: 
.:._,__\_ person may be a dependent, according to 
this \-ie,v, although able to 1naintain hi1nself \vith-
out any assistance from the decedent. And so the 
n1ere ability to earn a livelihood \vill not prevent 
one fro1n being a dependent." 
In the instant case Jirs. \\Thite had been supporting 
herself of necessity after the Decree of Divorce, but she 
certainly had anticipated being able to quit her job and 
stay hon1e \\-hile her husband \vorked and earned a liveli-
hood for both of the1n, in faet, it was 1nore than a 1nere 
an tici pa tion, it \Ya~s a specific agreement. The parties 
had specifically agreed that "\Vhen n1r. \i\Thite quit drink-
ing (and the fact is uncontroverted that he had quit 
drinking) they \vould resu1ne their marital relation and 
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she would quit work and he would support her. This 
specific agreement was not necessary as he had ·the obli-
gation by law to do so even without the agree1nent. 
CONCLUSION 
In co.nclusion it is important to note that all of the 
facts herein stated and all of the evidence of !Irs. White 
is uncontroverted; therefore, we can but conclude (1) 
that the marriage of ~Ir. and Mrs. White 'vas ternilnated 
by the death of J\1r. White, and was not therefore effected 
by the running of the interlocutory period, and (2) that 
although Mrs. \:Y-.-hite "\Vas not only employed during 
the p:eriod of tin1e frotn the date of divorce to. the date 
of the death of Mr. ,.V11ite but she was employed prior 
to the divorce also, nevertheless she was a dependant 
by law both before the divorce and after the divorce; and, 
that although she did not receive her actual support fron1 
h.i1n at the tin1e of his death she did have a reasonable 
future anticipation of dep·endency., and under the la'Y 
previously stated by this court, that is sufficient to 
establish dependency to justify an award, and the Appel-
lant therefore respectfully submits that this caJse should 
be reversed an·d an award made to the Appellant in the 
amount provided for by statute for the death of her 
husband '\Vhile in the ·course of his en1ployn1ent. 
Respectfully subn1itted, 
C. VERNON LANGLOIS 
Attorney for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
